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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the Shapley network design game on undirected networks. In this
game, we have an edge weighted undirected network G(V,E) and n selfish players where player
i wants to choose a path from source vertex si to destination vertex ti. The cost of each edge is
equally split among players who pass it. The price of stability is defined as the ratio of the cost
of the best Nash equilibrium to that of the optimal solution. We present an O(log n/ log logn)
upper bound on price of stability for the single sink case, i.e, ti = t for all i.
Keywords: Price of Stability, Shapley Network Design Game, network design game.
1 Introduction
We consider the Shapley network design game, which is also called network design games with fair
cost allocation, introduced in [2]. In this game, we are given a network and n selfish players. where
player i wants to go from source vertex si to destination vertex ti. The cost of each edge is shared
in a fair manner among players who pass it. We are interested in stable status of the network
where no player has the incentive to deviate from its current strategy, which can be modeled by
Nash equilibria. The price of stability, defined as the ratio of the cost of the best Nash equilibrium
and that of an optimal solution, is used to measure the inefficiency of Nash equilibria. We imagine
a network where the traffic will be initially designed by a central network coordinator. However,
the coordinator is unable prevent the network users from selfishly deviating from the designated
paths. Therefore, in this scenario, the best Nash equilibrium is an obvious solution to propose. In
this sense, we can think the price of stability as the degree of degradation of the solution quality
for the outcome being stable.
The price of stability was first studied in Schulzan and Moses [1] and was so-called in Anshelevich
et al. [2] where the Shapley network design game was also first explored. They showed that a pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium always exists and the price of stability of this game is at most the nth
harmonic number H(n) and also provide an example showing that this upper bound is the best
possible in directed networks. For undirected networks, Anshelevich et al. [2] presented a tight
bound on price of stability of 4/3 for single source and two players case. However, whether there
is a tighter bound for arbitrarily many players in undirect networks was left as an open question.
Fiat et al. [3] improved the upper bound to O(log log n) for a special case where each node of
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the network has a player and they are required to connect to a common destination. Chen and
Roughgarden [4] considered the weighted version of the game where each player has a weight and
the cost of an edge is shared among the players who pass it in proportion to their weights. As
opposed to the ordinary Nash equilibrium considered before, Albers [5] investigated the situation
where coordination among players is allowed and showed nearly matching upper and lower bounds
on the price of stability with respect to the notion of strong Nash equilibrium.
Our results : We prove that for undirected graphs with a distinguished destination to which all
players must connect, the price of stability of the Shapley network design game is O( lognlog logn) where
n is the number of players.
2 Preliminaries
We first introduce notations and formally state the problem. We are given a undirected network
G(V,E) and n selfish players. Player i has to choose a path from source vertex si to destination
vertex ti. Let Pi denote the set of simple si − ti paths. The cost of an edge e, c(e), is shared
equally by all players who pass e. An outcome of the game is specified by a set of n path, each
chosen by one player. For an outcome (P1, P2, . . . , Pn) for Pi ∈ Pi ,the cost assigned to player i is
ci(P1, P2, . . . , Pn) =
∑
e∈Pi
ce
fe
where fe is the number of paths that include e. We define the cost
of the outcome as
c(P1, P2, . . . , Pn) =
∑
i
ci(P1, P2, . . . , Pn) =
∑
e∈∪iPi
ce.
Let P−i denote the vector of paths chosen by the players other than i An outcome (P1, P2, . . . , Pn)
is a Nash equilibrium if for every player i , ci(Pi, P−i) = minP˜i∈Pi ci(P˜i, P−i).
The price of stability is defined as the ratio of the cost of the best Nash equilibrium of the game
to that of an optimal solution. We note that the optimal solution is the min-cost steiner forest
satisfying all connectivity requirement (si, ti)s.
We consider the following potential function, also used in [2], that maps every outcome into a
numeric value.
Φ(P1, . . . , Pk) =
∑
e∈E
fe∑
i=1
ce
i
=
∑
e∈E
ce ·H(fe) (1)
where fe denotes the number of paths Pi that include edge e and H(n) = 1+
1
2 +
1
3 + . . .+
1
n is the
n’th Harmonic number.
The most important property of the potential function is that if a single player i changes its
strategy then the difference between the potential of the new state and that of the original state is
exactly the change in the cost of player i [2].
In a finite game, better-response dynamics is the following process: If the current outcome is
not a Nash equilibrium, there exists a player who can decrease its cost by switching its strategy.
The player updates its strategy to an arbitrary superior one, and repeat until a Nash equilibrium
is reached. While better response dynamics needs not terminate in general, it must terminate in
finite steps in Shapley network design games since the potential Φ strictly decreases during the
process and no outcome appears twice in a finite game.
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3 An O( lognlog logn) Upper Bound for the Single Sink Case
We assume the network is connected and all players share the same destination t. It is easy to
see an optimal solution is a steiner tree with terminals {si}i=1,...,n ∪ {t}. Suppose the outcome
NASH = (PN1 , . . . , P
N
n ) is a Nash equilibrium which is obtained by better-response dynamics from
an optimal solution OPT = (PO1 , . . . , P
O
n ). We can assume without loss of generality that NASH
is also a tree. The property of the the potential function ensures that Φ(NASH) ≤ Φ(OPT ). We
denote paths of NASH and that of OPT by {PNi }i=1,...,n and {P
O
i }i={1,...,n}, respectively. We also
denote the trees of Nash by TN = ∪iP
N
i and that of OPT by T
O = ∪iP
O
i . Let |NASH| and
|OPT | be their costs respectively.
Let fNe denote the number of paths that include edge e in NASH. Let f
N (i) =
∑
e:fNe =i
ce and
gN (j) =
∑
e:fNe ≥j
ce =
∑
i≥j f
N (i). It is easy to see |NASH| =
∑
i f
N (i) = gN (1).
For ease of discussion, we create a dummy player 0 residing in s0 = t. We can see this player
has no influence on either NASH or OPT . First we consider the tree TO = ∪iP
O
i . Doubling
all edges in TO forms a Eulerian tour. Traversing this tour gives a sequence S of vertices in TO.
Suppose φ is a permutation of {si}i=0,...,n according to their first appearance in S. It is easy to see∑n
i=0 d(φ(i), φ(i+1 mod n+1)) ≤ 2|TO| = 2|OPT | where d(u, v) is the length of the shortest path
between u and v.
For any two players i and j, let LCA(i, j) be the least common ancestor of si and sj in tree
TN (take t as the root). We let P ji be the subpath of P
N
i starting from si and ending at LCA(i, j).
From the definition of Nash equilibrium, we know the cost of player i in NASH is less than that
of first reaching sj and then following the path P
N
j to t. Thus, we have the following.
∑
e∈P ji
ce
fNe
≤ d(si, sj) +
∑
e∈P ij
ce
fNe + 1
.
Similarly, we have ∑
e∈P ij
ce
fNe
≤ d(si, sj) +
∑
e∈P ji
ce
fNe + 1
.
Adding them together, We get
∑
e∈P ji
ce
fNe (f
N
e + 1)
+
∑
e∈P ij
ce
fNe (f
N
e + 1)
≤ 2d(si, sj).
We denote the left hand side of last equality by A(i, j). We have
∑n
i=0A(φ(i), φ(i+1 mod n+1)) ≤
2
∑n
i=0 d(vi, vi+1 mod n+1) ≤ 4|OPT |.
Now we prove
n∑
i=0
A(φ(i), φ(i + 1 mod n+ 1)) ≥ 2
∑
e∈TN
ce
fNe (f
N
e + 1)
= 2
∑
i
1
i(i+ 1)
fN (i) (2)
Actually, we only need to prove every e ∈ TN appears in some P
φ(i+1 mod n+1)
φ(i) or P
φ(i)
φ(i+1 mod n+1)
for 0 ≤ i ≤ n. It is easy to see P ji ∪ P
j
i is the unique path from si to sj in TN . For any e ∈ TN , let
T 1N,e and T
2
N,e be two trees obtained by deleting e from TN . It is easy to see T
i
N,e ∩{s0, . . . , sn} 6= ∅
3
for i = 1, 2 since each leaf of TN contains at least one player. So, there exists some i such that
φ(i) ∈ T 1e and φ(i+1 mod n+1) ∈ T
2
e and emust lie in the unique path from Sφ(i) to Sφ(i+1 mod n+1).
We let n1/2 = max{i|g
N (i) ≥ 12 · |NASH|}. We can see the following.
Φ(NASH) =
∑
i f
N(i)H(i) ≥
∑
i≥n1/2
fN (i)H(i) ≥ H(n1/2)
∑
i≥n1/2
fN (i)
= H(n1/2)g
N (n1/2) ≥
1
2H(n1/2)|NASH|.
Since Φ(NASH) ≤ Φ(OPT ) ≤ H(n)|OPT |, we have
|NASH| ≤
2H(n)
H(n1/2)
· |OPT |. (3)
From (2), we can get
2|OPT | ≥
∑
i
1
i(i+1)f
N (i) ≥
∑
i<n1/2
1
i(i+1)f
N(i) ≥ 1n1/2(n1/2+1)
∑
i≤n1/2
fN(i)
≥ 12n1/2(n1/2+1)
∑
i f
N(i) = 12n1/2(n1/2+1)
|NASH|.
Thus, we have
|NASH| ≤ 4n1/2(n1/2 + 1) · |OPT |. (4)
Combining inequalities (3) and (4), we have |NASH| ≤ min{ 2H(n)H(n1/2)
, 4n1/2(n1/2 + 1)} · |OPT |
for any n1/2. The right hand side takes maximum value O(
logn
log logn) · |OPT | by choosing n1/2 =
O(
√
logn
log logn). Therefore, we have proved
|NASH|
|OPT | ≤ O(
logn
log logn).
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